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Introduction
alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue fa-
mously claimed that “[w]hat matters at 
this stage is the construction of local forms 
of community within which civility and 
the intellectual and moral life can be sus-
tained through the new dark ages” (Mac-
Intyre 2007: 263). Ever since the publi-
cation of After Virtue his political project 
can be described as a form of communal 
self-defense. So, in the introduction to the 
1995 edition of Marxism and Christianity, 
MacIntyre claimed that “what is most ur-
gently needed is a politics of self-defense 
for all those local societies that aspire to 
achieve some relatively self-sufficient and 
independent form of participatory practice-
based community and that therefore need 
to protect themselves from the corrosive 
effects of capitalism and the depredations 
of state power” (MacIntyre 1995: xxvi ). 
In this paper I want to explore to what 
extent the politics of local communities is 
influenced and threatened by the powers of 
global capitalism and by the modern nation-
-state. To do so, I will first of all engage 
with MacIntyre’s aristotelian account of 
human flourishing developed in Dependent 
Rational Animals (1999). there MacIntyre 
argues that a flourishing human life needs 
the political structures of community life, 
which have to satisfy Karl Marx’s formulas 
*  I am greatly indebted to ruth Groff and Stephen 
M. Garrett for valuable comments on the first draft of 
this paper.  
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for justice: to each independent practical 
reasoner according to what she/he contrib-
utes, on the one hand, and from each disa-
bled and dependent person according to 
her or his ability, to each according to her 
or his needs, on the other hand. Following 
aristotle’s account of arete as intimately 
linked to law-making (which is the essen-
tial function of the political), I will then ar-
gue that the self-defense of practice-based 
local communities will necessarily fail un-
less there is a more fundamental attempt 
politically to combat the destructive and 
irrational power of capital. thus it is in the 
interest of the members of local commu-
nities to engage in politics on the national 
and international levels in order to defend 
(both in theory and in practice) an aristo-
telian anthropology presupposed by and 
embedded in the politics of the common 
good over the liberal-individualist anthro-
pology of laissez-faire capitalism.
the Claims of Dependent Rational 
Animals
there is good reason to put Dependent 
Rational Animals (1999) at the centre of 
MacIntyre’s practical philosophy. From 
the first edition of After Virtue in 1981 
to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
and then to Dependent Rational Animals 
(hereafter DRA), MacIntyre’s position has 
shifted significantly: from Aristotelian-
ism to thomistic aristotelianism or from 
aristotelianism conceptualized in terms 
of the unity of life, practices, and cultur-
ally embedded traditions, to one grounded 
in a metaphysical biology1. DRA is where 
1 Metaphysical biology will be understood here as 
a philosophical position which looks at the social life 
through the notion of teleology formulated first of all 
MacIntyre’s aristotelian metaphysical bi-
ology is articulated most clearly. Given 
that metaphysical biology is at the center of 
MacIntyre’s mature philosophical thought, 
it is possible to consider DRA as the key 
to understanding MacIntyre’s philosophy, 
including his political philosophy. 
One of the main arguments in De­
pendent Rational Animals centers on hu-
man agency where a person, within the 
structures of giving and receiving, must 
acknowledge his or her dependence on 
others in order to become an independent 
practical reasoner. We have become what 
we are – successful moral agents able to 
judge and act on a variety of goods – due 
to care, love, education, criticism, and 
correction, all of which we have received 
from others at different times and in differ-
ent places. One of the key goals of ethical 
life, then (if, indeed, we accept an aristo-
telian understanding of ethical life broadly 
understood), is to become an independent 
by aristotle. Its key assumption is that in as much as 
we can more or less accurately know what constitutes 
flourishing life for different animal species and plants, 
so it is equally meaningful to ask the question of hu-
man qua human flourishing. Thus despite the fact that 
human flourishing is partly an open ended social and 
historical phenomenon – it is influenced by the social 
environment and it changes in the course of human his-
tory, furthermore, it can and does take different cultural 
forms in different cultures – it is still possible to talk 
about external conditions and internal features which 
are essential for any human qua human wellbeing. Of 
course, a defensible account of metaphysical biology 
today should accept Ch. Darwin’s theory of evolution 
and thus reject aristotle’s notion that species are eternal 
and unchangeable. It is the revised version of aristote-
lian metaphysical biology that we find in MacIntyre’s 
mature philosophical work. For the short statement of 
the importance of metaphysical considerations as well 
as how his position has changed since the first edition 
of After Virtue, see MacIntyre (2007: xi). Also, for the 
scholarly accounts of MacIntyre‘s philosophical transi-
tion see thomas D. andrea (2006), Christopher lutz 
(2009), and Marian Kuna (2010).  
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practical reasoner who is able to not only 
understand and achieve her own individu-
al good, but also to contribute to the good 
of others. It is because we first received 
care, education, and unconditional love 
from others, and have become capable of 
achieving our individual goals, that justice 
requires us to acknowledge our former de-
pendence. 
In so arguing, MacIntyre elaborates 
on aristotle’s conception of zoon poli­
tikon. that is to say, practical rationality 
and moral agency are not simply given, 
such that they may serve, as it were, as the 
unproblematic premise of moral theory; 
rather, they are (successfully or unsuccess-
fully) developed through a set of social re-
lations which may be either beneficial or 
detrimental to them. the self is social and 
political entity par excellence, thus the no-
tion of disengaged reason is a fiction of a 
certain type of modern moral philosophy, 
the philosophy which MacIntyre rejects.2  
However, the thesis of acknowledged 
dependence is more fundamental than a 
mere recognition of our debt to particu-
lar others. We are dependent on the social 
networks of giving and receiving both be-
cause human life is essentially marked by 
bodily (that is to say, animal-like) vulner-
ability and because it is lived through at 
least three different stages of its develop-
ment – childhood dependency, adult inde-
pendence, and our dependence on the care 
of others when we are old. The first aspect 
of the acknowledged human dependence 
lies also in the fact that human bodily vul-
nerability is always present in our lives, 
that is, as a possibility of injury and/or 
2 For MacIntyre’s critique of modern moral phi-
losophy see his After Virtue (2007: 51-120).  
disability. therein lies the importance of 
learning from the disabled members of our 
communities. this is the need which is far 
more radical and demanding than a mere 
liberal dictum of tolerance and (legal) 
protection of those who are disabled. the 
second aspect of dependence rests on the 
fact that even when we are most capable 
and independent, when our faculties are 
at their peak, there will be a stage in our 
lives when we are dependent on the care 
of others again. the social embodiment of 
acknowledged dependence and vulnerabil-
ity sustain the asymmetrical networks of 
giving and receiving. We are called to give 
to meet the needs of others (whoever they 
may be), give without necessarily expect-
ing to receive something back from them. 
asymmetry allows us to combat tribalism 
and mafia like justice put forward by Simo-
nides in the first book of Plato’s Republic.  
these social networks of giving and re-
ceiving are what constitute and sustain the 
social and political body of a local com-
munity. MacIntyre argues that for these 
networks to function well, their members 
should practice the key virtues that ac-
knowledge dependence: practical wisdom 
(that is, a sound use of practical rational-
ity), courage, just generosity, temperance, 
truthfulness, honesty. We learn these and 
other virtues both due to existing social 
structures and networks as well as due 
to our engagement in a variety of prac-
tices through which we achieve (or fail to 
achieve) goods internal to these practices, 
goods which we start to consider as our 
own. Both in DRA and elsewhere MacIn-
tyre argues that the goods internal to the 
practices, which contribute to our flour-
ishing qua human flourishing, enable us 
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to learn how to distinguish between what 
seems to be good and what truly constitute 
our genuine good. So our ability to recog-
nize and reject impertinent and/or immedi-
ate desires, i.e., those which motivate us to 
pursue goals that, in the long run, contrib-
ute to our frustration or the frustration of 
others, is essential both for individual and 
for communal flourishing.
Virtues also allow us to realize that 
one’s individual good, in as much as it is 
achieved through a variety of practices and 
activities which are always cooperative, is 
impossible to realize without the existence 
of, and our own contribution to, the struc-
tures of the common good. It is precisely 
the notion of the common good – which 
can be realized only through rational de-
liberation with others and should not be 
confused with any form of nationalist sen-
timent or the feeble rhetoric about com-
munitarian spirit – that is presupposed by 
aristotelian metaphysical biology, which 
is essentially linked to the politics of local 
community. that is, our human qua human 
life, indeed the flourishing life, the best life 
possible, cannot be lived without the po-
litical structures of the common good. 
It is noteworthy that this implicit con-
clusion of MacIntyre’s thomistic aristote-
lianism is in line with Aristotle’s definition 
of the polis as “a community of similar 
people aiming at the best possible life,” 
aiming at eudaimonia as “some sort of 
activation or complete exercise of virtue”, 
and as something which is “prior in nature 
to the individual” (Aristotle 1998, 1328a, 
1253a). Thus human flourishing is essen-
tial both for aristotle and for a post-After 
Virtue MacIntyre and their conceptions 
of political community. The key question 
now is to discern how MacIntyre under-
stands political community, and what its 
contemporary forms are.  
the Politics of Local Communities 
MacIntyre’s answer is well-known. It can 
be only local community.3 However, this 
does not mean that MacIntyre’s position 
should be conceptualized as communitari-
anism.4 MacIntyre has repeatedly argued 
that the conceptualization of the politics 
of local communities should not be under-
stood in terms of the communitarian prior-
itization of (local) community qua (local) 
community (1998: 241, 1999: 142). Local 
communities are important in as much as 
they enable the realization of the common 
good. MacIntyre’s argument that the aris-
totelian politics of the common good can 
be realized only within local communi-
ties requires him to conclude that families, 
on the one hand, and the modern nation-
-states, on the other, cannot be the bear-
ers of the common good. Families are not 
sufficient in meeting a variety of needs for 
their members, and their flourishing is al-
ways dependent on and linked to the well-
being of wider communities. the modern 
nation-state is the locus of a variety of 
competing social interests which, as a rule, 
are settled not through widespread shared 
rational deliberation, but due to the money 
3 For a critical account of MacIntyre’s conception 
of the politics of local community see Murphy (2003); 
for an alternative account see Bielskis (2008). As will 
become evident from the argument developed in this pa-
per, I am now far more critical towards the feasibility of 
the politics of local communities than I used to be.     
4 Probably the most famous interpretation of Ma-
cIntyre’s political philosophy in terms of communi-
tarianism is S. Mulhall and a. Swift (1992). K. Knight 
(1996) was one of the first to reject the communitarian 
reading of MacIntyre as unfounded and inaccurate.  
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and political power of each bargaining in-
terest group. 
So the politics of the modern nation-
state, and, indeed, international relations, 
are the politics of the Nietzschean power 
games where those who win are the ones 
who have more money and power while 
those who lose are always the ones who do 
not have or have less of these resources. 
thus, since practical rationality can only 
be fully exercised through shared rational 
deliberation, it needs local settings where 
widespread public deliberation, when all 
the voices are heard, can be advanced. 
these local communities are what Mac-
Intyre considers as truly political settings. 
yet, what exactly are they? 
the most often used examples are tak-
en from practice-based communities and/
or practice-based institutions contributing 
to the common good: schools, orchestras, 
research departments, natural science labo-
ratories, theaters, fishing crews, churches. 
to these more commonly used examples 
MacIntyre has recently added four more 
examples: the Jesuit-led Guarani Indian 
settlements of 17th century in Paraguay, the 
19th century kibbutzim in Palestine, the mid 
20th century Marxist political settlement of 
Kerala in Southern India, and the political 
community of fishing cooperatives in Co. 
Donegal on the West coast of Ireland.5 In 
each of these and other cases the embodi-
ments of the genuine common good cannot 
be conceptualized through their reduction 
to the sum of individual goods nor should 
they be misunderstood in terms of public 
goods. the latter – street lights, policing, 
5 Cf. MacIntyre’s lecture “Two Kinds of Political 
Reasoning” delivered at London Metropolitan Univer-
sity in May 2010.  
minimal social security, roads and infra-
structure, etc. – no matter how important 
they are, contribute to the achievement 
of the goods of individuals qua individu-
als rather than qua members of this or that 
practice of the common good. 
thus, within the context of MacIntyre’s 
political philosophy, we can provide the 
following working definition of the com-
mon good: it is a political and social net-
work of giving and receiving due to which 
both individual and communal flourishing 
becomes possible via widespread rational 
deliberation. What is essential for such 
shared deliberation is the possibility of ar-
riving at a common mind. What matters is 
the soundness of practical reasoning and 
the accuracy of action in pursuing common 
goods, rather than the bargaining power of 
a particular interest group. 
What we need to ask then is: what are 
and should be the relationships between the 
larger political structures of advanced mo-
dernity and the local political communities 
conceptualized in thomistic aristotelian 
terms? Furthermore, should the modern 
liberal nation-state not be the locus of the 
politics of the common good only because 
of its size (quantity), or are there substan-
tive and structural (that is, qualitative) rea-
sons as well? 
It seems that MacIntyre’s answer to the 
second question is both. In DRA he states 
that 
although most citizens share […] in such 
public goods as those of minimal secure or-
der, the distribution of goods by government 
in no way reflects a common mind arrived 
at through widespread shared deliberation 
governed by norms of rational enquiry. In-
deed the size of modern states would itself 
preclude this (MacIntyre 1999: 131) 
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If, however, the issue were only that of 
the size of a polity, then it would be mere-
ly a technical problem. a speculation on a 
possible technical advancement in the field 
of information and communication tech-
nologies as well as constitutional changes 
of existing democracies, changes enabling 
widespread political participation, is nei-
ther new nor entirely utopian (see e.g. 
Qvortrup 2007). No matter how difficult 
it is for a proponent of the aristotelian 
conception of the politics of the common 
good to imagine such widespread delibera-
tion, its possibility should not be entirely 
ruled out. Similarly the fact that public de-
liberation is not practiced face to face in 
the modern liberal state (as was the case in 
ancient Greek city-states or is sometimes 
the case in relatively small local communi-
ties) should not be seen as the most essen-
tial problem. and this is not least because 
rational deliberation can occur and indeed 
does occur in a variety of other forms such 
as, for example, via email. therefore in the 
manner of aristotle’s conclusion in the first 
book of Politics, when aristotle argues that 
the polis is both quantitatively and qualita­
tively different from the household and the 
village, it is reasonable to conclude that 
MacIntyre’s claim of shared deliberation 
and the common good is impossible at the 
level of the liberal nation-state because of 
the substantive structural problems rather 
than because of its size. these substantive 
structural problems and the relationship 
between the politics of the modern state 
and the politics of the common good will 
concern the remainder of this paper. 
MacIntyre’s own answer to the ques-
tion of the relationship between the lib-
eral nation-state and the economic order of 
global capitalism, on the one hand, and the 
politics of the common good, on the other, 
is the position of communitarian protec-
tionism and/or collective self-defense. By 
“communitarian” here I do not mean the 
communitarianism of amitai etzioni or of 
Charles taylor, something that MacIntyre 
himself, as mentioned above, has repeat-
edly rejected. rather it means that it is 
through the construction and protection of 
local practice-based communities that the 
aristotelian politics of the common good 
so conceptualized can be sustained. 
What MacIntyre argues in DRA and, 
more recently in his London lecture “Two 
Kinds of Political Reasoning”, is that lead-
ers have to engage in alliance building and 
bargaining with a variety of interest groups 
and political parties to protect the political 
communities of the common good and to 
secure needed resources for local political 
communities. Such a position requires pro-
ponents to engage with the modern state on 
its own terms; that is, it should be concep-
tualized not using aristotle and thomas 
Aquinas, but in terms of rational choice 
theory and game theory. this, so it would 
seem, is to engage with the modern state 
in the way that it becomes intelligible in 
terms of preference maximization without 
any serious attempt at making these pref-
erences rationally intelligible to the party 
with which one engages or aligns. the 
preferences of a local community become 
one set of interests among other prefer-
ences of other interest groups. Pushing a 
step forward, we can say that MacIntyre’s 
protectionism demands the leaders of local 
communities, in exceptional cases, to be-
come Machiavellian in their dealings with 
the political and economic institutions of 
advanced modernity. 
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Aristotle on Virtue and Legislation
If MacIntyre claims to follow aristotle’s 
political philosophy, then it is important 
to examine how aristotle understands the 
relationship between ethics and politics, in 
particular the relationship between virtue 
and legislation. It will be instructive be-
cause both virtues and the common good 
on aristotle’s account are intimately linked 
to legislation – nomothetike, i.e. the science 
of legislation.6 It has been rightly argued 
several times (e.g., Kraut 2002) that the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which, in a narrower 
sense, is the study of everything “having 
to do with the character (ethos)”, has to 
be read together with the Politics, and that 
the Ethics should be read before the Poli­
tics, despite the fact that, most likely, the 
Ethics was written after the Politics (ibid.: 
16). the Ethics discusses what the human 
good and virtues are, while the Politics 
is mostly preoccupied with the different 
types of political constitutions and what 
the best polis is about. yet in a wider sense 
aristotle considered both of them to be 
politikē (political science and/or politics), 
the enquiry into eudaimonious-living, both 
for individuals and for the polis. as such, 
the distinction between ethics and politics 
was not something aristotle himself con-
sidered as philosophically significant; on 
the contrary, he saw his ethical enquiry as 
essentially political (ibid.). this, as I will 
argue, is significant as it allows us better 
to understand the importance of ethics for 
legislation and vice versa. 
6 It is important to bear in mind that nomothetike is 
both “science” and the actual activity of law-making. 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy is “science” directed to-
wards a right action, including political action, thus it is 
fully actualized when people engage in law making.  
That ethical enquiry is political is evi-
dent from aristotle’s conceptualization of 
arete. In the second book of Nicomachean 
Ethics he states that the nature of moral 
virtue is ethos as it results from habitua-
tion. Virtue is a state of mind that requires 
rational choice and is accompanied by 
feeling pleasure when hitting a mean be-
tween access and deficiency. So it is a state 
with regard to pleasure and pain when 
rationally choosing a right kind of action 
in different situations. repeatedly choos-
ing a mean produces a good habit, and so 
one becomes habituated in virtue. We can 
conclude that there are three essential ele-
ments to the nature of virtue: the state of 
mind accompanied by pain or pleasure, ra-
tional choice (attitude), and habituation.  
I want to focus on the relationship be-
tween rational choice and habituation. 
Much later, aristotle argues that once our 
habits are formed and we are accustomed 
to act in one way or another, the scope for 
free rational choice becomes very small to 
the extent that when, for example, a bad 
habit is fully formed, no rational delibera-
tion or rational argument, no knowledge 
of what is right, can undo it. Furthermore, 
the habituation in vices or in virtues also 
affects our attitudes and the way we look 
at human conduct and the social structures 
within which they are received and sup-
ported. thus habituation in virtues or vices 
always takes place within a certain social 
context of existing norms. the latter also 
contribute to directing and forming our 
habits at least in an obvious sense that we 
learn to act in one or another way through 
following others – first our parents, then 
our teachers, colleagues, friends, etc. aris-
totle calls the context of social norms, cus-
toms, written and unwritten laws nomoi. 
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richard Kraut argues that nomos (law) 
and lawfulness (nomimos) have to be un-
derstood in a much wider sense than we, 
moderns, understand law and lawfulness 
(ibid.: 105). Law is much more than ex-
isting written laws, while lawfulness, one 
of the two key characteristics of justice, 
is more than being a law-abiding person. 
Nomos includes laws, norms, and social 
mores, even people’s beliefs about what 
is fitting and binding – in short, every-
thing that gives stability and good order 
to a given society. One of the reasons why 
aristotle puts so much emphasis on laws, 
lawfulness, and legislation is precisely be-
cause nomoi have an intimate relationship 
to virtue: laws direct our actions, and good 
laws direct them well, i.e., they habituate 
us to virtue. 
It is for this reason that aristotle con-
ceptualized justice in the widest sense 
as nomimos – lawfulness – as it is only 
through right kind of laws and right kind 
of legislation that a just society is possible. 
Now the claim that justice is lawfulness, as 
Kraut rightly argues, is not a conservative 
claim (that is, it is not the claim that one 
must abide by existing nomoi no matter 
what they are or in order to preserve the 
existing order). rather, as it is with almost 
any other of aristotle’s concepts, it should 
be understood in teleological terms. Nomos 
can be called nomos if it functions as the 
law should function. that is, it should pro-
mote the common good. Furthermore, it is 
through nomimos that aristotle chooses to 
conceptualize justice as a comprehensive 
virtue. Good laws demand citizens to act 
virtuously in every situation: to be coura-
geous in battle when defending one’s city, 
temperate when distributing material re-
sources equally to others, and to oneself, 
etc. thus, at the very end of Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle concludes: 
But if one has not been reared under the right 
laws it is difficult to obtain from one’s earliest 
years the correct upbringing for virtue, becau-
se (…) the young, do not find it pleasant to 
live temperately and with endurance. For this 
reason, their upbringing and pursuits should 
be regulated by laws, because they will not 
find them painful once they have become ac-
customed to them. (Aristotle 2004: 1180b)
Aristotle continues saying:   
he [a man concerned with virtue] will be 
better able to do this if he has the chance of 
legislating, because care at the public level 
is evidently demonstrated through laws, and 
good care through good laws. (Ibid.: 1181a) 
So the importance of legislation, one 
of the key elements of politikē (the science 
and the art of politics), is essential in sus-
taining the politics of the common good. 
“Law has compulsive power” and it is law, 
according to aristotle, that is better suited 
to correct those who lack virtues, since 
people hate when someone commands 
against their impulses and desires, but they 
are able to take laws easier because “there 
is no oppressiveness in the law’s prescrib-
ing what is good” (ibid.: 1180a). 
Critical Assessment:  
Local Community, the state  
and global Capitalism 
It appears then that anyone who follows 
the aristotelian conception of politics and 
political community should recognize the 
essential importance of legislation in our 
attempts to build and sustain political 
community. there is no doubt that alas-
dair MacIntyre is aware of this. He has 
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repeatedly argued that local communities 
can flourish only if they are able to resist 
the centralizing power of the modern state 
(MacIntyre 1995, 1999, 2007). It follows, 
then, that the best way to achieve such 
flourishing is to attain as much autonomy 
for local (political) communities as pos-
sible, so that political communities pos-
sess as much legislative power as possi-
ble. Now even if this were desirable (it is 
indeed a big question whether it is), it is 
certainly not the direction in which the so-
cieties of advanced modernity are moving. 
If anything, the centralizing power of the 
state has increased and is still increasing. 
Certainly, it has been the case at least as 
far as the minimal legal provisions of basic 
civil rights are concerned. 
the negative aspects of centralization 
cannot be denied – two of which include 
an ever-expanding bureaucracy and the 
increasing distance between governing 
elites and the rest of ordinary people. yet, 
provisions for minimal health-care, edu-
cation, and other important public goods 
can only be universally provided through 
deeper integration and centralization and 
not through the withdrawal of the state. 
Furthermore, the argument in favour of 
more autonomy is not convincing because 
other important public goods such as the 
minimal social-order and security, free 
and equal access to decent primary, sec-
ondary and even university education can 
also only be provided by a more extensive 
rather than a smaller state. On the other 
hand, giving away more legislative power 
to local communities would necessarily 
mean a greater fragmentation of the social 
body and possibly greater differences and 
inequalities between different communi-
ties. So the poorer and less educated local 
communities are more susceptible to all 
the communitarian ills of which MacIntyre 
himself is so critical: narrow minded paro-
chialism, xenophobic sentiments, abusive-
ness towards minorities, etc. 
Of course, it does not follow that Mac-
Intyre’s conception of the politics of com-
munal self-defense exhibits these ills, but 
it is easy to see how his position can be 
read in this way, including in terms of 
Reagan-like neoliberal rhetoric of “roll-
ing back the frontiers of the state”. Such a 
reading would be a disastrous mistake be-
cause it would kill any aspects of emanci-
pation and emancipatory politics prevalent 
in MacIntyre’s political philosophy. 
therefore, I want to propose (to argue 
so would be the task of another paper) that 
what is needed at this stage is not so much 
to reclaim the legislative power for local 
communities, but for local communities to 
take an active role in the political process 
of law-making. Such a diagnosis is meant 
to challenge the dominant way of thinking 
and doing politics by revitalizing the theo-
retical tradition of emancipatory politics 
as it is understood in broadly neo-Marxist 
terms, a tradition in which we are enjoined 
to engage in progressive struggles in order 
to reclaim at least some influence within 
existing political institutions. 
Numerous studies and critical analy-
ses over the past decade have consistently 
shown that the growing economic dispar-
ity caused by the project of neoliberal glo-
balization has been detrimental not only 
to the worst off and the middle class, but 
to the whole of the economy (Gray 1999, 
Stiglizt 2003, Harvey 2005, 2009, Chom-
sky 2012). Financialization and neoliberal 
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deregulation have made the economic sys-
tem more unstable, far more prone to crises 
than previously imagined. It is within this 
system whose major players – corpora-
tions – have become legal persons obliged 
by law to maximize profit at the expense of 
all other considerations such as the quality 
of goods, safety, health, environment  and 
other societal issues (Bakan 2004). From 
the point of view of aristotelian practi-
cal philosophy, the economic rationality 
of profit maximization is irrational. It is 
based on limitless acquisitiveness, some-
thing which aristotle called the vice of 
pleonexia. 
Pleonexia is closely related to chrema­
tistike – the art of acquisition not for the 
sake of sound oikonomia, the household 
management, but for the sake of acquisi-
tion as such. Divorced from the aims of 
ethical life – acquiring wealth in order to 
use it for the sake of one’s individual well-
being (hence the acquisition of wealth is 
and should be always limited by the vir-
tue of sophrosune (moderation) as well 
as by the natural limit of how much one 
can consume) and in order to sustain the 
structures of the common good – chre­
matistike necessarily serves pleonexia as 
something which is directly opposite to 
justice. Aristotle used “pleonexia” in two 
ways.  In a narrow sense, it is an economic 
vice of both wanting more wealth than one 
deserves while gaining wealth and power 
at the expense of others. More generally, 
pleonexia refers to an undeserving sense 
of superiority over others when acquiring 
such external goods as money and honour 
(Kraut 2002: 138-145). There cannot be 
any doubt that the productive system of 
advanced capitalist economies has insti-
tutionalized pleonexia as its key internal 
driving force7. 
this is especially evident if we look 
at the capitalist production from the point 
of view of Karl Marx’s (1990) theory of 
surplus value. even if we reject Marx’s 
conclusions (and there are very good rea-
sons to reject at least some of them), his 
theoretical insight that the source of sur-
plus value is the control of surplus labour 
time is essential for any serious theoretical 
attempt to consider what should constitute 
just economic relationships. even if we ac-
cept the business owner’s right to a portion 
of surplus value generated by wage labour 
(as I think we should in order to account 
for the risk, the initiative, and the original 
creative idea of the business owner), the 
massive differences between surplus la-
bour time working men and women spend 
generating surplus value for owners, on 
the one hand, and the necessary time they 
spend working in order to earn their wages, 
on the other hand, are extreme and obvious 
in the majority of “successful” capitalistic 
corporations.
It is this difference that is at the core of 
capitalist exploitation. exploitation can be 
conceptualized in the following way. let 
us call it the exploitation Calculus (eC). It 
is designed to show the level of the exploi-
tation of labour in a given company func-
tioning in a capitalist economy. the con-
cept of eC is based on Marx’s distinction 
between necessary working-time or simply 
necessary labour (Nl) and surplus labour 
time (SL). In the first volume of Marx’s 
Capital (1999) Nl is the portion of a work 
7 For a more detailed, yet similar, philosophical ar-
gument on the institutionalization of pleonexia in capi-
talism see ruth Groff (2012). 
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day that a wage earner works in order to 
earn his/her wage. SL is the remaining part 
of the work day that the worker works to 
generate surplus income (including profit) 
for the owner. let us assume that, in per-
fect market competition, the value of a 
commodity is equivalent to its price. 
I propose, then, the following rationale 
to calculate eC. First, assuming that in-
come is generated by selling a company’s 
commodities in the market, a company’s 
annual income (minus constant capital 
(CC), i.e. the costs of raw materials plus 
the cost of the exploitation of the means 
of production plus investment) is divided 
by 52 weeks to calculate the Company’s 
Income per week (CIw). Second, the to-
tal number of employees (Noe) should be 
multiplied by 40 hours (assuming that a 
worker works 8 hours 5 days a week) to 
calculate the total Hours Worked (HW) by/
in the company. third, to calculate hourly 
productivity, that is generated Income per 
Hour (IpH), we need to divide CIw by 
HW (i.e. IpH = CIw/ HW). Fourth, sur-
plus value per week (SV), expressed in a 
given currency (e.g. litas), is CIw minus 
the Sum of real Wages per week (SrW is 
the sum of the real wages per week of all a 
company’s employees). Fifth, Surplus la-
bour time (SL) equals SV divided by IpH, 
while Necessary labour time (Nl) is SrW 
divided by IpH. eC then is the ratio be-
tween Sl and NL, or SL / NL. The higher 
the proportion of Sl per day, the higher 
exploitation there is. When the ratio is 1, 
it means that Sl and NL are equal (4 hours 
each, assuming that a normal working day 
is 8 hours). When EC is close to 0, there 
is virtually no exploitation. Conversely, 
when eC moves closer towards Sl, ap-
proaching the length of a full working day, 
the closer it gets to absolute exploitation8. 
to check the correctness of this formula, 
each individual case Sl plus Nl should 
equal HW.  
to illustrate the exploitation calculus, 
let us presume that there are 458 employ-
ees working in the Company X.9 let us 
also assume that the average salary of an 
employee is 5378 litas a month (or 1344.5 
litas a week) while the annual income (ex-
cluding constant capital) of Company X is 
321.8 million litas. Company X’s income 
per week (CIw) then is 6.188 million litas 
(i.e. 321.8 / 52). The total hours worked in/
by the company per week is 18 320 hours 
(458 x 40). The hourly productivity of la-
bour, that is to say the income generated 
by labour per hour (IpH), is approximately 
337.79 litas (i.e. 6.188 million / 18 320). 
Surplus value per week (SV) then is 6.188 
million litas minus 615 781 litas (615 781 is 
the Sum of real Wages per week (SrW), 
that is, 1344.5 litas multiplied by 458 em-
ployees), which equals approximately 
5.572 million litas. Surplus labour time 
per week (SL) is 16497.074 hours (i.e. 
5.572 million / 337.79). Necessary labour 
8 It is important to note that the ratio between sur-
plus labour time per week (Sl) and necessary labour 
time per week (Nl) can be expressed on an individual 
worker’s 8 hour working day scale only if SL and NL is 
divided by the total number of employees and then by 5 
days. absolute exploitation is to be understood as work 
without any salary, which would be a form of slavery. In 
a capitalist economy, unless it is voluntary work, abso-
lute exploitation is not possible (it would be robbery). 
this impossibility is in fact expressed mathematically 
as well: when SL amounts to a full working day and 
Nl is 0, eC – the ratio between Sl and Nl – does not 
make sense.      
9 Although the figures below are meant to be hypo-
thetical, they are taken from an actual lithuanian com-
pany. The most difficult variable to assess by the general 
public is constant capital. 
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time per week (NL) then is 1822.926 hours 
(615 781 / 337.79). the correctness of 
this calculation lies in the fact that Sl 
and Nl per week adds up to the total of 
18 320 hours. The expression of SL and 
Nl on the scale of an individual worker’s 
8 hour working day is 7.2 hours to 0.8 hours 
(SL/458/5 to NL/458/5), that is 7 hours 
12 minutes of surplus labour time to 
48 minutes of necessary labour time. Thus 
the Exploitation Calculus (SL/NL) in this 
case is approximately 9. the average worker 
in the company X, therefore, spends at least 
9 times more time to create surplus value 
for the capital owner as compared to the 
time needed to earn his/her salary. 
to conceptualize and measure the 
levels of exploitation is important as it 
indicates that necessary changes cannot 
be advanced on the local level only. the 
members of local (political) communities 
are, in one way or another, subjected to the 
power of global markets, which function 
on the basis of profit maximization. Thus 
the members of MacIntyrean and/or Aris-
totelian local communities are either com-
pelled to pursue profit and act against the 
virtue of sophrosune (even if they are in 
the lowest management positions of any 
business organization); or, if they are wage 
earners, subjected to the ruthless dictum of 
profit maximization on a daily basis. Insti-
tutionalized global markets are all-perva-
sive, and their corrosive power towards lo-
cal communities cannot be overestimated. 
the aristotelian political praxis to protect 
and sustain the forms of political life that 
are based on the genuine common good 
must be directed towards this source of in-
stitutional coercion.  
a viable tool for countering the power 
of the market turns out to be the state, i.e., 
the institution that has the power to pass 
laws. One of the pressing tasks of such 
emancipatory political praxis would be to 
dismantle the legal personhood of corpora-
tions and to make them accountable to the 
democratic public. at the level of philoso-
phy, virtue ethicists must articulate a bet-
ter theory of what an alterative economy 
should be about, an economy which is not 
based on the notion of unjust appropriation 
of surplus value at the expense of ordinary 
working men and women. any theory of 
social economy of this kind would have to 
reject the notion of the dominant idea of 
self-interested profit maximizing agency 
(be it a firm or a consumer), and would 
have to be rooted in an aristotelian anthro-
pology broadly understood. at the center 
of such an anthropology would be the idea 
that the structures of the common good are 
essential for human flourishing. Of course, 
these positive changes will be impossible 
without the boldness of genuine theoreti-
cal and political insight. thus, to para-
phrase alasdair MacIntyre, what we are 
waiting for is not a Saint Benedict, but for 
another – doubtless very different – Marx 
and another Saint Paul.  
Conclusion
MacIntyre’s post-After Virtue work, es-
pecially his Dependent Rational Animals, 
provides us with an outstanding theoretical 
account of an alternative aristotelian social 
ontology which is at odds with the domi-
nant conception of human life as driven by 
the narrow conception of preference maxi-
mization. Its central claim is that because 
individual human life is marked by physi-
cal and mental vulnerability, a flourishing 
human life cannot be lived without the 
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political structures of the common good. 
MacIntyre’s critique of the liberal demo-
cratic state as being unable to provide us 
with the political structures of the common 
good is convincing in both theoretical and 
practical terms. the modern liberal state, 
as it was convincingly argued in the past 
(rawls 1971, 1996), is not and cannot 
be based on the single conception of the 
common good. Furthermore, MacIntyre is 
right to argue that the actual practice of the 
politics at the level of the state has nothing 
to do with normative considerations a la 
rawls since what ultimately matters is the 
bargaining power of each interest group 
involved. What is less convincing is his 
claim that the only chance to survive “the 
new dark ages” is through “the construc-
tion of local forms of community.” Our 
engagement with aristotle’s conception of 
virtues and the key role legislation plays 
in acquiring them was designed to illus-
trate that the politics of aristotelian local 
communities is bound to be unsuccessful 
in their attempts to uphold “morality and 
civility” unless the irrationality of the lim-
itless capital accumulation is challenged at 
the national and global levels.  
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Straipsnyje analizuojami svarbiausi alasdairo 
MacIntyre’o veikalo Priklausomi racionalūs gyvūnai 
teiginiai. Jame teigiama, kad, nepaisant MacIntyre’o 
pateikiamos įtikinamos alternatyvios aristoteliškos 
socialinės ontologijos ir bendrojo gėrio politinių 
struktūrų sampratos, jo akcentuojama bendruomenių 
protekcionistinė politika yra abejotina, jei aristoteliš-
kos politikos šalininkai neturi galimybės pasipriešinti 
besaikei kapitalo kaupimo galiai. Straipsnyje taip pat 
yra aptariama Aristotelio dorybės samprata, o sykiu 
įstatymų leidybos reikšmė ugdant dorybes. Remian-
tis Karlo Marxo skirtimi tarp būtinojo ir pridedamo-
jo darbo laiko, straipsnyje pateikiama eksploatacijos 
skaičiuoklės formulė.        
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litika, Aristotelis, dorybė, emancipacija, globalus ka-
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aLasdairo MaCintYre’o veiKaLo „priKLausoMi raCionaLūs gYvūnai“  
teiginių poLitinės iMpLiKaCiJos 
Andrius bielskis 
S a n t r a u k a
Įteikta 2012 06 09
